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In 1998, the fourth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, defined the Buenos Aires
Action Plan (BAPA). The BAPA called the Parties to work on ‘core issues’ aimed at
facilitating the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: flexibility mechanisms, compliance,
adverse effects, technology transfers, policies and measures, land-use, land-use change and
forestry (LULUCF). The core issues were due to be resolved for the sixth Conference of the
Parties (COP-6) in November 2000. But COP-6 failed to reach an agreement among Parties
and decision was taken to resume the discussion at a 'COP-6 bis' conference in Bonn in July
2001.
Meanwhile the US Administration changed and newly elected President George W. Bush
clearly stated in March that the US rejected the Kyoto Protocol as a ‘fatally flawed
agreement’. Despite various pressures for the US to rally the process engaged since Kyoto in
1997, the US Administration attended the Bonn conference as an observer only. Surprisingly,
however, a major positive outcome emerged during 'COP-6 bis' as Parties managed to reach a
political –though not legally binding- agreement, the so-called ‘Bonn agreement'. In addition
to recognizing the need for new and additional funding, the Agreement laid the bases for
decisions on transfer of technologies, minimization of adverse effects, commitments,
mechanisms, compliance and the taking into account of LULUCF. The Agreement was
translated into operational terms at COP-7 in Marrakech (29 October - 10 November 2001).
The outcome, the ‘Marrakech Accords’, paves the way to the ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol and its possible entry into force within not too distant a future.
More precisely, with respect to the LULUCF, the Parties agreed on a methodology for
accounting for sinks credits that would add up to the assigned amount of a Party. In addition to
projects achieved domestically or through Joint Implementation, afforestation and
reforestation projects are considered as eligible under the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) up to 1 % of base year emissions, during the first commitment period
1.
The main objective of this paper is to assess the Bonn-Marrakech agreement, in terms of
abatement cost and emission trading as compared with the initial agreement reached in Kyoto
(the Kyoto Protocol). Our reference case (the 'Initial Deal’) does not include the use of sinks
credits, as the Kyoto Protocol does not give explicit figures nor method to estimate them. In
addition, two hypothetical situations are considered. The first describes the “missed
compromise” that could have emerged among all Parties in November 2000 in The Hague.
The second is a virtual case where the US is assumed to be part of the Bonn-Marrakech
Agreement, along with all the other Parties. These two cases contribute to shed the light on the
Bonn-Marrakech Agreement potential pitfalls.
In the current situation, the US is out of the negotiation process and has no emission reduction
commitment. Given the projections of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions used in this study, the
Former Soviet Union countries (FSU) and the Eastern European Economies (EEE) that are
                                                          










































part of the Annex B have potentially enough ‘Hot Air’ to fulfill the overall commitment of the
Annex B bubble, without any domestic abatement effort from the other Annex B countries
(the "Annex II" countries of the Convention
2). We show that in the theoretical case where no
limit would be imposed on the selling of Hot Air, the permit price according to the POLES
model would be zero as no market equilibrium could take place.
This is why, next, we examine the economic impacts of restrictions to hot air trading, for FSU
and EEE as well as for the other countries. We shed the light on the potential market power of
the former countries that arises from the Bonn-Marrakech Agreement.
                                                          










































Technical notes on the study
All the quantitative results presented in this paper stem from the POLES
3 model and the
ASPEN
4 software developed at IEPE. POLES is a model of the world energy system that
simulates energy demand and supply on a year-to-year basis, up to 2030. The world is
described with 38 countries or regions and 15 main energy demand equations for each
country. 24 power generation technologies, of which 12 new and renewable technologies are
explicitly incorporated. The POLES model also projects the energy sector's CO2 emissions up
to 2030 as well as the marginal abatement cost curves for these emissions in each of the 38
countries or regions.
The ASPEN software input data consist in the Marginal Abatement Costs assessed for the
various countries / regions with the POLES model. They allow to simulate emission permits
supply and demand in 2010 (chosen as a representative year for the first commitment period)
for any specific market size and hence to determine a market equilibrium price (the emission
permit price). Trade is assumed to take place on a perfect competitive market.
The study focuses only on CO2 emissions and does not consider the emission reductions of the
other greenhouse gases (GHGs) mentioned in the Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol. Work is
underway to incorporate other GHGs in the model. As carbon dioxide is by far the main
anthropogenic GHG, we assume here that the main conclusions and the general trends will
hold, if the other GHGs are included.
The first part of this study deals with the economic consequences of the Kyoto Protocol that
was agreed upon in 1997. This is the ‘reference case’ or ‘Initial Deal' (ID). The hypothetical
compromise in The Hague is then examined (referred to as the Missed Compromise, or MC).
The Bonn-Marrakech Agreement is assessed in the third part, starting with the (unrealized)
hypothesis that the US takes part in the Agreement (scenario BM0) and ending with the
analysis of the actual agreement reached (BM1). Eventually, using the ASPEN software
results, the fourth part deals with the analysis of the restriction on the hot air trading and the
impact of the market power of FSU and EEE.
For all cases analyzed below, the emission reduction objectives are those set for the Annex B
countries in the Kyoto Protocol. These objectives can be achieved through domestic
reductions as well as through the three flexibility mechanisms adopted in the Protocol:
International Emission Trading (IET), Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). As stipulated in the Marrakech Accords, we consider that the emission
reductions gained through these three mechanisms are totally fungible, which means that all
units may be transferred several times between Parties and/or legal entities
                                                          
3 POLES stands for Prospective Outlook on Long term Energy Systems.










































As already explained at length in the economic literature on Climate Change (Criqui and al.,
1999 ; Energy Journal, 1999), Annex B countries are supposed to import units of emission
reduction through these flexibility mechanisms when the marginal cost of domestic reductions









































1. The Reference Case, or the ‘Initial Deal’ (ID) of the Kyoto Protocol
Various assumptions are adopted to build the 'Initial Deal' (ID) case. All Annex B countries
take part in emission trading, as all of them initially adopted the Kyoto protocol. A 10 %
‘CDM-accessibility factor’ is considered as a reasonable hypothesis, meaning that only 10 %
of the overall potential emission reductions from non-Annex B countries' energy sectors are
considered as being feasible CDM projects. This accessibility factor originates in the possible
institutional pitfalls or technical difficulties in the identification, definition and
implementation of the projects (lack of infrastructures or expertise for instance), as well as in
the difficulty of estimating the corresponding baselines.
Furthermore, transaction costs are associated to all CDM projects to account for the costs of
various procedures inherent to the implementation of any project (administrative procedures or
certification of the reduction units for instance).  They raise the cost of the reduction of a ton
of carbon and are supposed here to be 20% of the technical cost.
The ID scenario does not account for any sinks in the emission reductions. While the Kyoto
Protocol includes provision for sinks in the Articles relating to land-use, land-use change and
forestry (LULUCF), no actual figures are provided. The accounting method is left to the
following Conferences of the Parties. Excluding sinks from the Reference Case aims at
showing what the negotiations following those in Kyoto brought in economic terms, when
sinks allow the different Parties to lower their emission reductions.
Similarly, although the Kyoto Protocol explicitly calls for some ‘share of proceeds’ to assist
the developing countries in meeting the costs of adaptation to climate change, no share of
proceeds is included in the Initial Deal as defined here.
Under these conditions, the international permit price would be 48 $/tC
5 (Table 1 below).
Table 1 : The ID scenario, costs and emission reductions
48




for IET / JI
Traded 
Hot Air
Sinks in EEE 
and FSU
19755 513 186 327 - - - - - -
4990 136 61 75 - - - - - -
2538 66 24 41 - - - - - -
1321 35 14 21 - - - - - -
-15286 - - - - - 76 277 - -













28604 750 286 464 - 0 52 97 315 0
-17629 2 - - 2
10974 752 286 464 2
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Due to the level of their marginal costs, most Annex B countries would reach their emission
reduction targets both through domestic reductions and through imports (from JI and CDM
projects, or from International Emission Trading). The purchasing world regions would be the
USA, the European Union, Canada-Australia-New Zealand (CANZ) and Japan. The total
abatement costs (TAC) incurred would be of more than $ 28 billion. The selling regions would
be Non-Annex B countries through CDM projects, as well as, for the bulk of it, the Annex B
Parties of the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
6 and of the Eastern European Economies (EEE)
7.
FSU and EEE would sell emission reduction units through both hot air and reductions
achieved within their own energy sector (either through JI projects or by domestic measures),
as long as the marginal abatement cost of these reductions is lower than the international price
of permits. Their total benefits would amount to more than $ 17 billion.
Box 1 : Hot air and the POLES model projections
Due to severe economic slowdown, the POLES business as usual (BAU) projections to 2010 for the FSU and
EEE energy CO2 emissions are 305 MtC lower than their 1990 emissions. This represents a substantial reduction
of emissions referred to as 'natural Hot Air' in the table below.
Furthermore the Kyoto Protocol 2010 entitlements of Poland - Czech Republic - Hungary - Slovakia are globally
106.8% those of 1990
8. This allows them to bring 12 MtC additional Hot Air to the 9 MtC of 'natural' hot air in
the market.
On the other hand Bulgaria – Romania - Slovenia’s Kyoto Protocol target in 2010 is overall 97 % of 1990
emissions
9. This reduces their volume of tradable Hot Air by 2 MtC.




816 540 277 100% 277 -
Bulgaria/ Slovenia/ 
Romania
67 48 19 97% 17 2
305 315 2 Total
EEE







165 9 106.8% 21 -






Target          
(2010 objective / 
1990 emissions)
174
        Source : POLES model
The 2 MtC of untradable hot air from Bulgaria-Romania-Slovakia are mentioned under the 'HA balance' label in
the tables 1, 2 and 3. They are included in the calculation of the total 'emission reductions', as indeed they are
actual reductions in emissions.
FSU Hot Air represents 88% of the overall hot air available. Therefore its impact on the market equilibrium is
prevailing.
                                                          
6 FSU includes Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia.
7 EEE includes Bulgaria, the Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
8 The Base Year / Period for Poland is 1988 and for Hungary it is the average of 1985-1987.  See the UNFCCC
guidelines on Reporting and Review, FCCCP/CP/1999/7,  February 2000, available on :
http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop5/07.pdf.










































Graph 1 illustrates how the emission permit market would perform in this reference case. The
departure point of the supply curves corresponds to the amount of hot air in FSU and EEE: up
to 315 MtC, FSU and EEE can provide emission reductions for a nil marginal cost. The 464
MtC imports from purchasing countries are the traded amounts that lead to the $ 48 permit
price. The gap between these traded quantities and the total reduction dot at 752 MtC
represents the domestic reductions achieved by the countries (288 MtC).
Graph 1 : ID scenario market equilibrium
Annex B Demand 
Annex B Supply
Annex B Supply + CDM 
Total Reduction (Protocol + 
Non-Protocol Countries), 
including all Hot Air























































2. The Hague ‘missed compromise’ (MC)
The assumptions adopted in this hypothetical case refer to some of the decisions that might
have been be made, should COP-6–Part1 have resulted in an agreed compromise.
In addition to the assumptions of the previous ID scenario, the share of proceeds to meet the
costs of adaptation in particularly vulnerable developing countries is set to 2% of the Certified
Emissions Reductions of a CDM project taking place in a non ‘Least Developed Country’.
The maximum credits for sinks are set to 3% of base year emissions as had been proposed as a
first evaluation of what could be added to the Assigned Amount of the Annex B Parties
through LULUCF projects
10 (see figures in annex 1). As at this stage sinks are reported
  costless in the ASPEN software, importing Annex B countries are assumed to first take
advantage of sinks to reach their Kyoto target, before turning to other solutions such as
emission credit imports or domestic reductions. Thus, sinks are calculated as the maximum
potential for sinks credit. Taking sinks into account is tantamount to leveling-off the other
sources of emissions reductions.
The emission permit price declines from 48 $/tC for the ID scenario to 29 $/tC (Table 2) in the
The Hague missed compromise (MC scenario), because the overall emissions reductions are
smaller (647 MtC instead of 752 MtC), due to the inclusion of sinks for up to 105 MtC. The
domestic reductions decrease from 288 to 186 MtC while the volume of trade is almost
unchanged at around 460 MtC.
However the sources of exports of permits differ from those of the ID case. Sinks allocated to
FSU and EEE raise their emission assigned amounts. They can thus be traded along with hot
air. Their amount is referred to as 'Sinks in FSU and EEE' or 'traded sinks'.
Emission reductions from CDM projects decrease from 52 to 34 MtC. The introduction of
costless sinks into the current scenario and the consequently lower market price make CDM
projects become less competitive. Given the limited volume of emission reduction units from
CDM projects, the impact of the 2 % Share of Proceeds is conversely almost insignificant:
setting the Share of Proceeds at 0 % keeps the permit price at 29 $/tC and the emission
reductions from CDM projects at 34 MtC.
As a consequence of all these changes, the total abatement cost incurred by any Annex B
importing country declines as does the benefit for exporting regions FSU and EEE (from more
than $ 17 billion to about $ 11 billion).
                                                          










































Table 2 : costs and emission reductions of The Hague MC scenario
29




for IET / JI
Traded 
Hot Air
Sinks in EEE 
and FSU
11615 513 123 340 50 - - - - -
2343 136 36 65 36 - 3 - - -
1408 66 15 41 9 - - - - -
591 35 9 16 10 - - - - -
-9849 - - - - - 53 277 33 -













15956 645 184 462 - 105 34 70 315 43
-11436 2 - - 2
4520 647 184 462 2























                     
+  Sinks   
(dom.+CDM)
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Sellers   (MtC)





















































3. The Bonn Agreement
Although the US did not actively take part in the negotiations at COP6-bis and COP 7, it is
worth analyzing what would have been the consequence of the adoption of the Bonn-
Marrakech Agreement by the US (BM0), along with the other Parties. Of course this case BM0
is purely hypothetical but conclusions are worth considering, when compared to the actual
situation (BM1).
The assumptions for BM0 and BM1 cases are the same as for the MC case, except for sinks. In
this section, sinks are assessed according to the Bonn-Marrakech Agreement. Thus, the
maximum potential for sinks considered in ASPEN is calculated as the sum of the projections
for:
- the maximum accountable credits for forest management under Art. 3.4 inscribed in
Appendix Z of the Bonn Agreement and modified in the Marrakech Accords,
￿  credits for Afforestation, Reforestation and Deforestation (ARD) activities under Art. 3.3
and credits for agriculture management under Art. 3.4,
￿  the maximum importable credits for sinks through CDM ARD projects (1% of the Party's
base year emissions).
Given the specific situation of FSU and EEE, it is assumed that they would not carry out CDM
projects and consequently would not import reduction units from sinks projects through CDM.
Therefore, in this study, these sinks (1% of base year emissions) are not included in the total
amount allocated to these countries.
As the US did not take actively part to the Bonn-Marrakech discussions, approximate values
for sinks have been set on the basis of data submitted by the US
11 and data from FAO
12 (see
annex 2).
Interestingly enough, the results are very close to those displayed for ‘The Hague missed
compromise’ (MC) case, with respect to costs as well as emission reductions and their
distribution (Table 3).
                                                          
11 See FCCC/SBSTA/2000/MISC.6.
12 See TBFRA-2000 (UN-ECE/FAO)









































Table 3: costs and reductions of a hypothetical BM0 scenario
28




for IET / JI
Traded 
Hot Air
Sinks in EEE 
and FSU
11001 513 118 340 55 - - - - -
2683 136 38 78 20 - - - - -
786 66 15 21 30 - - - - -
394 35 9 10 16 - - - - -
-9392 - - - - - 51 277 34.5 -













14863 629 179 450 - 121 32 64 315 38.5
-10733 2 - - 2
4130 631 179 450 2
Sellers   (MtC)














                     























+ untraded HA - sinks) 
Annex B results
This clearly shows that the Bonn-Marrakech Agreement would not have brought significant
changes from the compromise discussed in The Hague, had the US not withdrawn from the
negotiation in-between.
Since the US did not take part in the Bonn-Marrakech Agreement, the other Annex B
countries face an odd situation: emission reduction supply is greater than demand (Table 4).
On the demand side, Annex B importing countries or regions must reduce their emissions by
237 MtC, according to the POLES calculations. Accounting for sinks, the remaining required
emission reductions amount to 170 MtC. On the supply side, the hot air and sinks surplus for
trade is 353 MtC from FSU and EEE.
Table 4: The odd Bonn-Marrakech Agreement
Annex II countries FSU and EEE 
(*)
Europe 136 9 + 11 116
CANZ 66 27 + 3 36
Japan 35 13 + 3 19
FSU 34.5 277 + 34.5
EEE 4 38 + 4
Total 237 170 315 + 38.5
Reduction 
Objectives for 2010





(*)  No sinks under CDM projects for FSU and EEE.
(**) Hot Air + Sinks to FSU and EEE
Source : ASPEN calculations
Globally speaking, Annex B countries in a ‘Kyoto Protocol without the US’ could thus reach
(and do better than) their target, without any emission reduction action: the emission









































reductions from the economic collapse of the Economies In Transition more than offsets the
projected emission increases of the other Annex B countries over the period 1990-2010.
Furthermore, there would be no need for Annex B countries to achieve CDM projects in
developing countries. As put by Resources For the Future: "A Kyoto Protocol without the US
is like musical chairs with one too many chair – there’s a lot of marching around but nothing
happens” (Kopp, 2001).
Graph 2: The Bonn-Marrakech Agreement and the US withdrawal.
Annex B Demand 
Annex B Supply
Annex B Supply + CDM 















Actually, the quantity of hot air traded will very likely be lower than what is available.
Although it is theoretically possible to face the situation described in graph 2, it seems
unlikely that the different Parties will agree on an exchange for free of the emission reduction
units from the FSU and EEE hot air. If it were the case, the benefits the latter regions could
hope for would then be reduced to nil. Furthermore, some of the importing Parties (especially
the EU) seem willing to keep an environmentally significant agreement that is reachable only
if part of the hot air is not traded.
In such a situation, FSU and EEE can take advantage of selling only part of their hot air rather
than the whole volume of it, as they are the only sellers of emission reductions among Annex









































4. The restriction of hot air and the potential market power of Russia
and Eastern European countries
The analysis first focuses on the market equilibrium resulting from various assumptions about
the amount of hot air traded by FSU and EEE. Of course this analysis is currently fiction. But
it may provide guidance for future negotiations in the next Conferences of the Parties, either
on the side of importing countries or on that of hot air providing countries.
Apart from the general eligibility conditions for an Annex B Party to participate in the
mechanisms
13, there is currently no provision about any restriction on hot air trading in the
Bonn-Marrakech Agreement. However, if FSU and EEE brought the whole bulk of their hot
air to the market, the permit price would theoretically be nil, as already underlined in the
previous section.
Article 3.13 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997) mentions the possibility for Parties to
‘bank’ their emission reductions for subsequent commitment periods. The Marrakech Accords
clearly stipulate that all assigned amounts units can be banked unlimitedly. So, banking of hot
air might be an option for restricting trading of this surplus in the first commitment period.
Except for the limitation of the quantity of hot air in the market, the previous assumptions
adopted above in the Bonn-Marrakech Agreement section (part 3) still hold in the following
analysis.
Graph 3 shows the relationship between the share of hot air that would be traded and the price
of an emission reduction unit that could be decided by sellers or agreed upon by sellers and
buyers. Based on ASPEN simulations, it confirms the previous results: as the hot air
restriction loosens (i.e. the share of available hot air which is traded increases), the permit
price declines. The latter evolves from $ 23 when hot air is not traded, to nil when 45% or
more of hot air is traded.
Graph 3
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13 See the Marrakech Accords, http://www.unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf









































Hot air trading restriction also affects the suppliers’ benefits. Interestingly enough, their
benefits are highest when only 10% of hot air is traded. They decrease from that point on to nil
when more than 45 % is traded (Graph 4).
Moreover the US withdrawal seriously affects the FSU and EEE benefits by strongly
depressing global demand: they are at most about $ 1,6 billion whereas they were above $ 10
billion in all scenarios assuming US participation.
Graph 4
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FSU and EEE clearly dominate the international supply of emission reductions. Thus, if they
had the market power to do so, they would trade their hot air up to 10% of the total hot air
theoretically available. The question is then: do they have this market power?
Up to now, negotiations at the various Conferences of the Parties did not lead to any
restriction on hot air. But it is not in the FSU's and EEE's interest to sell out their hot air in the
first commitment period. As Manne and Richels (2001) point out, the provision for ‘banking’
emission reductions could well lead FSU and EEE to exert some market power on other
Annex B countries. In keeping part of their emission reduction credits untraded during the first
commitment period, FSU and EEE could use them in a subsequent commitment period. They
would increase their benefits in the first and second periods, compared to a non-banking
option (Manne & Richels, 2001). However the market power of FSU and EEE depends on the
extent to which they can bank their emission reductions credits.
Any restriction on hot air trade clearly entails that Annex B importing countries must operate
domestic emission reductions in order to reach their targets. The higher the restriction, the
b. Effect of hot air trading restriction on FSU and EEE benefits









































higher the domestic effort will be. But even if hot air is not traded at all, Annex B importing
countries will resort to emission permit purchases, JI projects or CDM projects in addition to
domestic actions, because the international permit price is lower than the marginal cost of
certain domestic measures. Thus, when restriction on hot air is 100 % (no trade during the first
commitment period), imports of reduction units still represent about 60 % of the targets
(Graph 5).
Graph 5



























The nature of imports considerably changes along with the magnitude of hot air restriction but
not the geographic origin. With a 55% restriction on hot air, imports only consist in reduction
units from the FSU and EEE (traded sinks and hot air). As the restriction increases towards
100 %, emission permit trading and JI form the bulk of imports, whereas CDM projects do not
contribute much (Graph 6). Actually emission permit imports and emission reduction units
from JI also stem from FSU and EEE, because of the comparatively lower marginal abatement
costs of these countries than those of developing countries. The international supply of
emission reductions is clearly dominated by FSU and EEE.
























sinks in FSU and EEE
The participation of developing countries through the CDM is consequently relatively limited









































hypothesis on the CDM accessibility factor chosen, which is set in this study at 10%. The
annex 3 gives details on the impact of the accessibility factor in the BM1 scenario with 100%
hot air banked (i.e. no hot air traded during the first commitment period). It appears that CDM
projects almost represent half of the emission reductions achieved, when this access factor is
75 %.
When hot air is partially (up to 55 %) or totally banned from trading, the permit price is
positive. All the participating Parties face a competitive situation with respect to the remaining
emissions reductions needed to meet the global Kyoto Protocol target. This means that
emissions reductions are traded until the equalization of marginal abatement costs among
Parties.
i. No hot air traded
In that case we analyze the impact of the total withdrawal of hot air from the trading system
during the first commitment period in the Bonn-Marrakech Agreement (case BM1,0). It
amounts to a situation where FSU and EEE sell only emission reduction units obtained from JI
projects within their energy sectors. This case is close to the Russian 'Green Investment
Scheme' proposal (Vrolijk, 2001), except that in the latter case Russia gets the money first
(from the sale of hot air) and then proceeds to emissions reductions in its energy sector (in re-
investing all the revenues in such projects).
Table 5 : Case BM1,0, costs and emission reductions
23




for IET / JI
Traded 
Hot Air
Sinks in EEE 
and FSU
0 - --- -- -- -
2271 136 31 85 20 - - - - -
673 66 12 24 30 - - - - -
340 35 7 11 16 - - - - -
-1307 - - - - - 43.5 - 34.5 277













3284 170 50 120 - 66 27 54.5 0 38.5
-1518 317 - - 317
1766 487 50 120 317
Sellers   (MtC)














                     























+ untraded HA - sinks) 
Annex B results
In case FSU and EEE do not trade their hot air at all, the permit price is $ 23 (Table 5), which
is close to the MC and BM0 cases without US participation. The other Annex B countries
reach their targets through domestic emission reductions (50 MtC), certified emission









































reductions from CDM projects (27 MtC), and emission reduction units from Economies In
Transition (93 MtC from JI projects and surplus of sinks in FSU and EEE).
The costs are slightly lower than in the BM0 case for Europe, CANZ and Japan but
considerably lower for CANZ and Japan compared to the Missed Compromise case. This is
mainly explained by the quantity of sinks credits allocated to these countries in MC and BM
cases (see annex 1 and 2). Conversely, as noted above (4.b), FSU and EEE are net losers
compared with a situation where the US takes part to the agreement. Their benefits amount to
about $ 1.5 billion compared with $ 11 billion in the MC and BM0 cases and $ 17.6 billion in
the ID case.
The actual emission reductions (including the unused hot air), meaning the environmental
integrity of the Protocol, are obviously lower than in the previous cases (minus 23% compared
with the Bonn-Marrakech Agreement with US - BM0 -, minus 35% compared with the 'Initial
Deal', which, in our study, does not consider sinks). They remain nevertheless significant at
487 MtC (of which 317 MtC of untraded hot air).
ii. FSU and EEE Market power
We now move on to the situation where FSU and EEE exert their market power by selling
10% only of their hot air (see graph 4): case BM1,1.
Table 6 : Case BM1,1, costs and emission reductions
17




for IET / JI
Traded 
Hot Air
Sinks in EEE 
and FSU
0- - - - - - - - -
1755 136 24 92 20 - - - - -
526 66 9 27 30 - - - - -
268 35 5 13 16 - - - - -
-1345 - - - - - 34 28 34.5 249













2549 170 38 132 - 66 21 42 31 38.5
-1542 285 - - 285
1007 456 38 132 285
Sellers   (MtC)














                     























+ untraded HA - sinks) 
Annex B results
As expected the permit price and the total abatement costs for the purchasing countries are
lower than in the previous case while the benefits of FSU and EEE are maximized. Still, these
benefits are very close to those gained in case BM1,0 when no hot air at all is traded.
As expected too, the environmental integrity is decreasing. The overall emission reductions
(still including the untraded hot air) are now 455 MtC, which is 28% below the BM0 case and









































From cases i and ii, it appears that FSU and EEE have interest in banking all their hot air
during the first commitment period. First of all, exercising their market power does not bring
much to them: the maximized benefits through this process appear to be about the same as the
benefits drawn from JI projects only (i.e. when no hot air is traded). Then, the more hot air is
banked, the more the constraint for FSU and EEE of meeting post-Kyoto emissions reductions
commitments may be alleviated (depending on the constraint they would accept in the second
commitment period).
From the environmental point of view, it is clear that the efficiency, in terms of overall
emissions reductions, would be highest in the first commitment period if hot air was banked.











































The Bonn Agreement and the subsequent Marrakech Accords are considered to be major shifts
in the Climate Change negotiations, as all Parties but the US accepted to positively work
towards the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. However our paper shows that it would
probably have been better to sign an Agreement in The Hague, when the US still participated
in the negotiation. The costs incurred by the participating countries are very similar in either
the hypothetical case of The Hague compromise or in the Bonn-Marrakech Agreement, but the
environmental efficiency would have been greater in The Hague case with the US
participation.
In addition to the fact that it is regretful that the US is not ready to comply with its Kyoto
targets, the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol process ironically leaves a great caveat:
the hot air available for trade from FSU and EEE more than offsets the required emission
reductions of the other Annex B countries.
Consequently, the hot air issue has to be dealt with, if an international emission permit market
is to take place. The question is then how to manage hot air trade. Our calculations show that
if the market power of FSU and EEE is important, their interest would be to sell only 10 % of
their available hot air, in order to maximize their benefits. Conversely, in case of a weak
market power of FSU and EEE, negotiations could take place in order to set a minimum
permit price.
One way to deal with the surplus of emission reductions from FSU and EEE would be the
possibility for these countries to bank part or all of this hot air for subsequent commitment
periods in order to meet future reductions objectives. This solution has many advantages: it
helps keeping an environmentally significant Protocol; it keeps the permit price high enough
so that countries are encouraged to implement policies for domestic emission reductions; it
allows Eastern European Economies and countries from the Former Soviet Union to make
substantial benefits from the supply of emission reduction units from JI projects and/or from
(limited amount of) hot air while ensuring that these countries could meet some more stringent
future commitments fairly easily by using the previously banked Assigned Amount Units.
However, in either case, the Bonn-Marrakech Agreement does not leave much room for CDM
projects between Annex B Parties and developing countries. Obviously, this result depends
strongly on the assumption made on the accessibility of CDM projects and the choice of a
10% access factor. Annex 3 shows the impact of different values of the access factor in the
case of the Bonn-Marrakech agreement, without the US, when all hot air is banked.
All the results naturally rely on the POLES emission projections and the marginal abatement
cost curves calculations, especially with regards to the quantity of hot air available from FSU
and EEE and to the required emissions reductions in 2010 for the other Annex B countries.
However, as shown in the paper, the quantity of hot air is about twice the demand for emission
reduction units, in the case the US withdraws from the process, given the volume of sinks
allocated to the different Parties at the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences. Therefore, even










































Last, it is important to underline that our analysis assumes that all Annex B Parties but the US
have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Consequently the Marrakech Accords are implemented for
those ratifying Parties. Although still uncertain, this hypothesis could well turn into reality by
the end of 2002. Furthermore, our analysis is relevant only if FSU and EEE fulfill the
eligibility requirements needed to participate in the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto
Protocol. This particularly supposes that they annually comply with measuring, reporting and
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Sinks credits    =  










































ANNEX 2 :  Sinks in the Bonn-Marrakech agreement
MtC/yr (MtC/yr) (MtC/yr) (MtC/yr) (MtC/yr) (MtC/yr)
Australia 0 2.18 1.31 3.49 3.49
Austria 0.63 0.21 0.84 0.84
Belgium 0.03 0.37 0.40 0.40
Bulgaria 0.37 0.34 0.71 0.37
Canada 12 4.60 1.63 18.23 18.23
Czech Republic 0.32 0.52 0.84 0.32
Denmark 0.05 0.1 0.19 0.34 0.34
Estonia 0.1 0.11 0.21 0.10
Finland 0.16 0.20 0.36 0.36
France 0.88 1.51 2.39 2.39
Germany 1.24 3.30 4.54 4.54
Greece 0.09 0.29 0.38 0.38
Hungary 0.29 0.24 0.53 0.29
Iceland 0 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.08
Ireland 0.05 0.91 0.15 1.11 1.11
Italy 0.18 0.47 1.42 2.07 2.07
Japan 13 3.35 16.35 16.35
Latvia 0.18 0.10 0.28 0.18
Lichtenstein 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Lithuania 0.28 0.14 0.42 0.28
Luxembourg 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05
Monaco 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherlands 0.01 0.04 0.60 0.65 0.65
New Zealand 0.2 7.71 0.20 8.11 8.11
Norway 0.4 0.02 0.14 0.56 0.56
Poland 0.82 1.25 2.07 0.82
Portugal 0.22 0.17 0.39 0.39
Romania 1.1 0.62 1.72 1.10
Russian Feder. 33 8.28 41.28 33.00
Slovakia 0.51 0.20 0.71 0.51
Slovenia 0.36 0.05 0.41 0.36
Spain 0.67 0.84 1.51 1.51
Sweden 0.58 0.19 0.77 0.77
Switzerland 0.5 0.01 0.14 0.65 0.65
Ukraine 1.11 2.50 3.61 1.11
United Kingdom 0.37 0.25 0.56 2.09 3.27 3.27
USA 28 10.40 16.54 54.94 54.94
Total 97.72 7.09 9.83 49.25 174.29 159.93
Total
Total excl. Sinks 
in CDM for FSU 
and EEE
Sinks, Appendix 
Z Bonn text      
(Art 3.4)*






*: The figure for Russia for Art 3.4 forest management is 33 MtC (according to what was
agreed upon in Marrakech)
Sources:
-  Appendix Z:  FCCC/CP/2001/L.11/Rev.1, 27 July 2001  (available on:
http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6secpart/l11r01.pdf) + Marrakech Accords & The















































Sinks in FSU 
and EEE
100% 10.0% 56.0% 11.5% 22.5%
75% 12.5% 51.0% 14.0% 22.5%
50% 16.0% 43.5% 18.0% 22.5%
25% 22.5% 30.5% 24.5% 22.5%
10% 29.5% 16.0% 32.0% 22.5%
0% 38.0% 0.0% 39.5% 22.5%
Source: POLES & ASPEN calculations
Hypotheses: Bonn-Marrakech Agreement, no US participation, all hot air is banked for










































.GU %CJKGTU FG 4GEJGTEJG FG N￿+’2’
%CJKGT ￿￿ $.#0%*#4& 1￿￿ %4+37+ 2￿￿ -+6175 #￿￿ #RT￿U .C *C[G￿ $QPP GV /CTTCMGEJ￿ NG HWVWT
OCTEJˆ KPVGTPCVKQPCN FGU RGTOKU FG FTQKVU F￿ˆOKUUKQPU GV NC SWGUVKQP FG N￿CKT EJCWF￿ LCPXKGT
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿DKU $.#0%*#4& 1￿￿ %4+37+ 2￿￿ -+6175 #￿￿ #HVGT 6JG *CIWG￿ $QPP CPF /CTTCMGEJ ￿ VJG
HWVWTG KPVGTPCVKQPCN OCTMGV HQT GOKUUKQPU RGTOKVUCPF VJG KUUWG QH JQV CKT￿ LCPXKGT ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ $.#0%*#4& 1￿￿ %4+37+ 2￿￿ 641//’66’4 /￿￿ 8+)7+’4 .￿￿ ’SWKV[ CPF GHHKEKGPE[ KP
ENKOCVG EJCPIG PGIQEKCVKQPU ￿ C UEGPCTKQ HQT YQTNF GOKUUKQP GPVKVNGOGPVU D[ ￿￿￿￿￿ LWKNNGV
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ /’0#06’#7 2JKNKRRG￿ (+010 &QOKPKSWG GV .#/; /CTKG￿.CWTG￿￿ 2TKZ XGTUWU
SWCPVKVˆU ￿ NGU RQNKVKSWGU GPXKTQPPGOGPVCNGU FOKPEKVCVKQP CW FˆXGNQRRGOGPV FGU ˆPGTIKGU
TGPQWXGNCDNGU￿ OCK ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿DKU /’0#06’#7 2JKNKRRG￿ (+010 &QOKPKSWG GV .#/; /CTKG￿.CWTG￿￿ 2TKEGU XGTUWU
SWCPVKVKGU￿ ’PXKTQPOGPVCN RQNKEKGU HQT RTQOQVKPI VJG FGXGNQROGPV QH TGPGYCDNG GPGTI[￿
UGRV￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ (+010 &QOKPKSWG￿￿ .OKPVˆITCVKQP FGU OCTEJˆU ˆNGEVTKSWGU GWTQRˆGPU ￿ FG NC LWZVCRQUKVKQP
FG OCTEJˆU PCVKQPCWZ · NOˆVCDNKUUGOGPV FOWP OCTEJˆ TˆIKQPCN￿ PQX￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ &’56#+5 )JKUNCKPG￿ )+..16￿%*#22#< #PPKEM￿￿ .C RTQFWEVKXKVˆ TGXKUKVˆG￿ LWKP ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ &#/+#0 /KEJGN GV )4#< ,GCP￿%JTKUVQRJG￿￿ %QOOGTEG KPVGTPCVKQPCN GV FˆXGNQRRGOGPV
UQWVGPCDNG ￿ NGU ITCPFU RCTCFKIOGU￿ UGRV￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ %#8#4& &￿￿ %14076 2￿￿ /’0#06’#7 2￿￿ .GU RC[U GP FˆXGNQRRGOGPV GV NC
RTˆXGPVKQP FW TKUSWG ENKOCVKSWG ￿ 3WGNNGU RGTURGEVKXGU RQWT NG OˆECPKUOG FG
FˆXGNQRRGOGPV RTQRTG !￿ QEV￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿DKU %#8#4& &GPKUG￿ %14076 2KGTTG￿ /’0#06’#7 2JKNKRRG￿￿ *QY EQWNF FGXGNQRKPI
EQWPVTKGU RCTVKEKRCVG KP ENKOCVG EJCPIG RTGXGPVKQP￿ VJG %NGCP &GXGNQROGPV /GECPKUO CPF
DG[QPF￿ HˆX￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ 01’. 2￿￿ .C EQPUVKVWVKQPCNKUCVKQP FW TˆIKOG LWTKFKSWG KPVGTPCVKQPCN FGU
KPXGUVKUUUGOGPVU RˆVTQNKGTU GV NC ￿TG￿EQPUVTWEVKQP FW OCTEJˆ OQPFKCN￿ UGRV￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ .1%#6’..+ %￿￿ .GU EQPFKVKQPU FG VTCPURQUKVKQP FGU KPUVKVWVKQPU FG OCTEJˆ FCPU NGU
ˆEQPQOKGU GP VTCPUKVKQP ￿4WUUKG￿ ￿ NG ECU FG NOˆPGTIKG￿ LWKN￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ %4+37+ 2￿￿ 8+)7+’4 .￿￿ 4ˆIWNCVKQP FGU OCTEJˆU FG FTQKVU F￿ˆOKUUKQP PˆIQEKCDNGU RQWT
NG %1￿￿ WPG RTQRQUKVKQP FG RNCHQPFU RQWT NGU SWCPVKVˆU GV RQWT NGU RTKZ￿ LCPX￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ DKU %4+37+ 2￿￿ 8+)7+’4 .￿￿ 6TCFKPI TWNGU HQT %1￿ GOKUUKQP RGTOKVU U[UVGOU ￿ C RTQRQUCN
HQT EGKNKPIU QP SWCPVKVKGU CPF RTKEGU￿ HˆX￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ (+010 &￿￿ 4￿INGU FOQWXGTVWTG FG OCTEJˆ GV RQVGPVKCNKVˆU FG FˆUVCDKNKUCVKQP FOWPG
KPFWUVTKG ˆNGEVTKSWG KPVˆITˆG GP ˆEQPQOKG QWXGTVG￿ 5EˆPCTKQU KPUVKVWVKQPPGNU FOˆXQNWVKQP
FG NOKPFWUVTKG ˆNGEVTKSWG HTCP`CKUG￿ CQ￿V ￿￿￿￿￿ CQ￿V ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ .1%#6’..+ %￿￿ .C OWVCVKQP FG NOKPFWUVTKG RˆVTQNK￿TG TWUUG ￿ XGTU NOˆOGTIGPEG
FOGPVTGRTKUGU · NOQEEKFGPVCNG !￿ LCPX￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ DKU .1%#6’..+ %￿￿ 6JG 4WUUKCP QKN KPFWUVT[ TGUVTWEVWTCVKQP ￿ VQYCTFU VJG GOGTIGPEG QH









































%CJKGT ￿￿ /’0#06’#7 2￿￿ #RRTGPVKUUCIG FG NC FKXGTUKVˆ GV EQORˆVKVKQP GPVTG QRVKQPU
VGEJPQNQIKSWGU RQWT NC RTQFWEVKQP F￿ˆNGEVTKEKVˆ RJQVQXQNVC˚SWG￿ CXTKN ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ $.#0%*#4& 1￿￿ %4+37+ 2￿￿ 641//’66’4 /￿￿ 8+)7+’4 .￿￿ &KHHˆTGPEKCVKQP￿ ˆSWKVˆ
KPVGTPCVKQPCNG GV GHHKECEKVˆ FCPU NC NWVVG EQPVTG NG EJCPIGOGPV ENKOCVKSWG INQDCN￿￿ OCK
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿ ￿%4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿%QOOWPKECVKQP CWZ ,QWTPˆGU #(5’ ￿￿￿￿ UWT NO’EQPQOKG FG
NOGPXKTQPPGOGPV GV FGU TGUUQWTEGU PCVWTGNNGU￿ 6QWNQWUG￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ OCK ￿￿￿￿￿￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ %4+37+ 2￿￿ -178#4+6#-+5 0￿￿ .GU EQ￿VU RQWT NG UGEVGWT ˆPGTIˆVKSWG FG NC TˆFWEVKQP
FGU ˆOKUUKQPU FG %1￿ ￿ WPG ˆXCNWCVKQP KPVGTPCVKQPCNG CXGE NG OQF￿NG 21.’5￿ QEV￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ (+010 &￿￿￿ .C EQPEWTTGPEG FCPU NGU KPFWUVTKGU ˆNGEVTKSWGU ￿ NOGHHKECEKVˆ CW RTKZ FG NC
EQORNGZKVˆ VTCPUCEVKQPPGNNG GV TˆINGOGPVCKTG !￿ OCTU ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ .1%#6’..+ %￿￿ 6TCPUKVKQP ˆEQPQOKSWG GV ￿TˆUKNKGPEG￿ QTICPKUCVKQPPGNNG ￿ NGU
GPUGKIPGOGPVU FG N￿KPFWUVTKG FW IC\ GP 4WUUKG￿ HˆX￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿￿ 01’. 2￿￿ 2WKUUCPEG UVTWEVWTGNNG GV F[PCOKSWG FG NOˆEQPQOKG RQNKVKSWG OQPFKCNG ￿ NC
UE￿PG RˆVTQNK￿TG FGRWKU ￿￿￿￿￿ PQX￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿ $174)’1+5 $￿￿ .GU DKHWTECVKQPU FG VTCLGEVQKTGU VGEJPQNQIKSWGU FCPU NGU KPFWUVTKGU FG
RTQEGUU ￿ NG ECU FG N￿KPFWUVTKG FW TCHHKPCIG FCPU NGU FˆEGPPKGU SWCVTG￿XKPIV GV SWCVTG￿
XKPIV￿FKZ￿ LWKP ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿ &’ .# 8’)# 0#8#441 #￿￿ .￿CPCN[UG FGU F[PCOKSWGU FW UGEVGWT RˆVTQNKGT FCPU NG
FˆXGNQRRGOGPV ˆEQPQOKSWG FW /GZKSWG ￿ HQPFGOGPVU F￿WPG RTQDNˆOCVKSWG
KPUVKVWVKQPPCNKUVG￿ OCK ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿ (+010 &￿ GV EQNNCD￿￿ .#/146 (￿￿ 37#56 1￿￿ 510) -￿￿ .C F[PCOKSWG F￿QTICPKUCVKQP
FGU KPFWUVTKGU FG TˆUGCWZ ˆPGTIˆVKSWGU ￿ N￿CRRTQEJG FGU CRRQTVU FG NC 0QWXGNNG
’EQPQOKG +PUVKVWVKQPPGNNG￿ OCK ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿ /#46+0 ,￿/￿￿ .G EJCPIGOGPV VGEJPQNQIKSWG FCPU NG FQOCKPG FG N￿ˆPGTIKG ￿ FKOGPUKQP
U[UVˆOKSWG GV TˇNG FGU CPVKEKRCVKQPU￿ OCK ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿ .’(’$84’ *￿ ￿ /’0#06’#7 2￿￿ 4WRVWTG F￿WPG UKVWCVKQP FG NQEM￿KP GV KPVTQFWEVKQP FG
NC XCTKˆVˆ FCPU NG UGEVGWT FG N￿ˆENCKTCIG￿ OCK ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿ /#46+0 2￿’￿￿ 6JG GZVGTPCN EQUVU QH GNGEVTKEKV[ IGPGTCVKQP ￿ NGUUQPU QH VJG 75 GZRGTKGPEG￿
OCK ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿ +5.#5 5#/2’4+1 ,￿￿ .G EQPVQWTPGOGPV FW ￿NQEM￿KP￿ ˆVCDNK FCPU NGU U[UV￿OGU FG
RTQFWEVKQP ˆNGEVTKSWG ￿ NG ECU FG NC VWTDKPG · IC\￿ CXTKN ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿ %4+37+ 2￿￿ (+010 &￿￿ &G N￿ˆEQVCZG · N￿JCTOQPKUCVKQP KPVGTPCVKQPCNG FGU RTKZ FG
N￿ˆPGTIKG ￿ WP FˆRCUUGOGPV RQUUKDNG FW EQPHNKV RTQFWEVGWTU￿EQPUQOOCVGWTU CWVQWT FW
RCTVCIG FG NC TGPVG￿￿ %QNNQSWG OKPKUV￿TG FG N￿’PXKTQPPGOGPV￿ #FGOG￿ %045 UWT .GU
TGEJGTEJGU HTCP`CKUGU GP ˆEQPQOKG GV UEKGPEGU UQEKCNGU UWT N￿GHHGV FG UGTTG ￿ DKNCP GV
RGTURGEVKXGU￿ 2CTKU￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ CXTKN ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿ ￿ CPPGZGU￿
%CJKGT ￿ .1%#6’..+ %￿￿ .C TˆQTICPKUCVKQP FG NOKPFWUVTKG FGU J[FTQECTDWTGU TWUUGU ￿ WPG OKUG GP
RGTURGEVKXG￿ PQX￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
%CJKGT ￿ DKU .1%#6’..+ %￿￿ 6JG TGQTICPK\CVKQP QH VJG 4WUUKCP J[FTQECTDQPU KPFWUVT[ ￿ CP
QXGTXKGY￿ PQX￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ R￿
.GU %CJKGTU UQPV FKURQPKDNGU GP VGZVG KPVˆITCN UWT NG UKVG KPVGTPGV FG NO+’2’￿ · RCTVKT FG ￿￿￿￿ ￿
JVVR￿￿￿YYY￿WROH￿ITGPQDNG￿HT￿KGRG￿2WDNKECVKQPU￿ECJKGTU￿JVON
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